



Still a Future for the European Social Model? 
 
 
Christoph Hermann, University of Vienna 





The 2008/9 financial and economic crisis has discredited the neoliberal narrative which 
claims that the market is self-correcting and that private enterprise is superior to the public sector. 
In Europe, it turned out that the crisis highlighted the social and the democratic (as well as the 
ecological) deficits which have arisen over the past 30 years and which finally had eroded some of 
the most distinctive features of the European Social Model (ESM). However, the crisis has at least 
opened up space in the political discourse for alternative ideas concerning the creation of a more 
socially sustainable economy. In the essay it is argued that a renewed ESM is indispensable for a 
type of European integration based on social equality and environmental responsibility. After a 
short reference to Polanyi´s concepts of decommodification and disembedded capitalism the 
paper summarises the debate about the ESM and tries to capture its essence as it developed 
during the postwar decades. In the next section, the erosion of the ESM is described and 
important drivers of neoliberal restructuring in the EU are identified. The following part outlines 
major objectives in a possible revitalisation of the ESM based on three major projects: the renewal 
of the European welfare states, the reconstruction and expansion of the public sector and the 
democratisation of the EU and of European societies. 
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For a brief moment during the 2008/9 financial crisis it looked as if the European Social 
Model could experience a revival. In the wake of the crisis even the British government, since the 
late 1970s one of the most radical pro-market and pro-private capital governments in Europe, 
nationalized failing banks. Given the scale of the crisis, the elites were shocked about the fragility 
of disembedded capitalism and its market-based solutions for almost all aspects of social life, 
including job-based healthcare, credit-financed homes and stock-market dependent retirement 
incomes. European politicians from all political backgrounds were demanding new and more 
regulations, while governments were passing emergency budgets with deficit spending to kick-
start the economy. One year later, the situation could not be more contrasting: The financial 
crisis was replaced by the European budget crisis and governments across Europe have started to 
cut-back the public sector in order to please the financial markets, which caused the problem in 
the first instance. Hence what started as a moment of hope for the European Social Model may 
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very well be the last stage in a several decade long process of decay. On the other hand, what else 
than a revival of the ESM can actually save the economy and result in a new phase of prosperity?  
In this essay we argue that the essence of the European Social Model is the comparable 
advanced degree of decommodification attained by European countries during the postwar 
decades. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s this movement came to a halt and was 
actually reversed. Despite frequent references to the importance of the ESM, the policies adopted 
in the last four decades, including most notably the privatisation and commodification of public 
services, resulted in a substantial recommodification of European societies, eroding the very 
foundations of the ESM. The financial crisis, which is also a crisis of neoliberal economic policy, 
presented an opportunity to resurrect some of the features of the initial ESM, including a strong 
public sector and encompassing public services. While in the wake of growing budget deficits, 
governments seem determined to erase the last remains of social Europe, we argue that a renewed 
ESM is indispensable towards a type of European integration based on social equality and 
environmental responsibility – instead of boundless competition and market deregulation. By 
emphasizing the need for far-reaching decommodification, coupled with a thorough 
democratization of European societies, we also argue that (neo-) Keynesian deficit spending alone 
will not provide an opportunity for starting a socio-ecological transition or transformation. 
The first section of the paper discusses the concepts of decommodification and 
disembedded capitalism by using Polanyi’s insights. The second part summaries the debate about 
the European Social Model and tries to capture the essence of the ESM as it developed during the 
postwar decades. The following section, then, describes the erosion of the ESM following the 
neoliberal turn in the 1970s. The next part outlines major objectives in a possible revitalisation of 
the ESM based on three major projects: the renewal of the European welfare states, the 
reconstruction and expansion of the public sector and the democratisation of the EU and of 
European societies. The article ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2. Market Interference and Decommodification 
 
Following the work of Karl Marx, who revealed the fundamental contradictions in 
capitalist economies, Karl Polanyi came to the conclusion that market societies need to be 
protected from self-regulated markets in order to prevent them from collapsing. The ‘protection 
of man, nature, and productive organisation’ is only possible through ‘an interference with 
markets for labour and land as well as for the medium of exchange, money and thereby ipso facto, 
impaired the self-regulation of the system’ (Polanyi 2001: 225). In order to rehabilitate the lives 
of men and women and their environments, political intervention must necessarily aim at 
‘reducing the flexibility of wages and the mobility of labour, giving stability to incomes, 
continuity to production, introducing public control of national resources and the management 
of currencies’ (ibid). What Polanyi concludes for labour, land and money holds for a large variety 
of goods that are essential for human reproduction. However, while Polanyi stresses the need to 
restrict market forces, an even more radical form of social embedding takes place when goods and 
services are provided outside the market – by public institutions in pursuit of a public interest 
rather than of the interest of maximising profits (Altvater 2004).1 
In as much as market mechanisms are suspended or severely restricted, social embedding 
amounts to a decommodification of the social existence of workers and citizens. 
Decommodification, in Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) view, means a relative independence of 
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individuals from markets. There are multiple sources of decommodification. Modern welfare 
states that provide a certain amount of income allowing their citizens to exist without selling their 
labour power on the labour market are another important source of decommodification. Of 
course, decommodification does not mean that the commodity form as dominant mode of 
socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) is abolished – otherwise the respective society can no longer be 
called capitalist. Instead, decommodification is always relative and describes not an ultimate state 
of society but a process in which the social reproduction of society and its members becomes 
gradually less dependent on market-mediated exchange and private accumulation. As will be 
pointed out in the remainder of this paper, relative decommodification critically shapes 
expectations, survival strategies and, hence, the mode of living of citizens in capitalist societies.  
Polanyi came to his conclusions after studying the big agrarian crisis and the subsequent 
depression of 1873-1886 and living through the Great Depression of 1929-1931. The New Deal, 
which followed the Great Depression in the United States, can be seen as an attempt to re-embed 
the economic system in a set of social relations. The large number of statutory regulations 
introduced during the New Deal years, many of which directly interfered in markets, reduced 
fluctuations and flexibility and thereby restored social stability.2 To this extent, the changes 
indeed amounted to a shift towards ‘organised capitalism’ (Offe 1989), although the deeper 
contradictions of capitalist accumulation were not solved. And although it is true that the period 
of economic growth following the crisis was primarily the result of a simultaneous boom in 
demand created by the Second World War and the modernisation of production following the 
spread of Fordist mass production techniques, the social embedding of markets was also a 
constitutive element in what became known as the ‘golden years’ of capitalism. New rules for 
trade and international capital transfers and the introduction of a rule-based and therefore stable 
international currency exchange system (Bretton Woods) were complemented by new norms 
regulating the use of labour power.  
 
 
3. The Essence of the European Social Model 
 
The invention of the term European Social Model (ESM) is commonly attributed to 
Jacques Delors. Then president of the European Commission, the social democrat Delors 
introduced the ESM in the early 1980s to distinguish Europe from the United States – and to 
some extent Thatcher-ruled Britain (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007:126). Hence, initially the 
ESM was a political intervention, launched to strengthen the rather fragile European identity and 
to propose an alternative to the ultraliberal capitalisms of the United States and the United 
Kingdom (ibid.) With the prevalence of the neoliberal forces in Europe, the ESM subsequently 
became a tool to gear support for the European project despite the neoliberal content of 
European integration (Hermann 2007). Trade unions and social democratic parties frequently 
made reference to the ESM when they talked about Europe (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 128-
31). While in political terms the ESM was used as an affirmative concept, as an idea how Europe 
should look in a globalized world, soon an academic debate emerged in which scholars attempted 
to define the concept analytically. There are three main strands to this debate: One that attempts 
to measure the ESM in quantitative terms using indicators such as GDP per capita (for wealth), 
unemployment, inequality and poverty (Hermann 2009: 83-4). A second one that emphasises 
common institutional settings, reaching from the Varieties of Capitalism Approach to 
comparative welfare state and industrial relations concepts (ibid 84-7). A third strand of literature 
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focuses on the ‘Europeanization’ of institutions and cultures as a result of the integration process 
(Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). 
All three approaches have serious problems: While a number of European countries 
display a much higher degree of equality and a much smaller proportion of poverty than the 
United States, differences between EU member states are often greater than the difference 
between the European mean and the US (Albers, 2006: 412). The institutionalist literature often 
oversees the fact that Britain is also part of liberal capitalism and has a liberal welfare state 
(Schmid 2010: 9-10). The European literature, furthermore, lacks  a deeper knowledge of the 
American situation and usually ignores the profound changes that have taken  place in the United 
States since the 1960s. Precisely because the integration process primarily promoted liberalization, 
including the liberalisation of public services, it arguably led to an ‘Americanization’ rather than 
‘Europeanization’ of institutions and policies in the member states (Wincott 2003: 293). 
Instead of contrasting the United States, Europe adopted many of the New Deal features 
after the Second World War, including minimum wages and maximum working hours, yet the 
process of social embedding did not stop at interfering with market mechanisms. Instead, most 
European countries developed large public sectors, comprising classic public services such as 
energy supply, transport and health and education, but also key enterprises in mining, industrial 
production and in the banking sector (Frangakis et al 2009). Nationalised companies did not 
necessarily operate outside the market system, yet they differed from private companies insofar as 
they met a number of non-commercial objectives. Public companies, in other words, served a 
broader public interest (Millward 2005). This is not only true of public services, where public 
providers were required to offer the same terms of access to services users regardless of their 
individual purchasing power, but also for banks and industrial companies. While public banks 
provided credits on favourable conditions, nationalised industries frequently sold their products 
below world market prices, and because the products were often resources or semi-finished goods, 
not only citizens but also private capital profited from this behaviour. At the same time, 
nationalised banks and industries gave governments the opportunity to intervene directly in the 
economy instead of relying on tax incentives and government subsidies as indirect forms of 
market steering. The public banking sector is a good example. Through public banks the state 
could channel streams of investment into the broader economy. The problems faced by current 
governments of convincing private banks to lend at least some of the money they have received as 
part of the banking sector bailout packages to their clients clearly shows the merits of a public 
banking system.  
Apart from the large public sector, the most notable difference between the US and 
Europe lies in the development of comprehensive welfare states. While American trade unions 
focused on the creation of a ‘private welfare state’ for their members in the core industries, in 
Europe social benefits such as pensions and health care are not provided by companies but by the 
state, and as public services they cover the vast majority of the population. Furthermore, although 
there are important differences in terms of funding, accessibility and generosity, western 
European welfare regimes share the common characteristic that all (national) citizens are entitled 
(de jure or de facto) to income and resources that grant a socially defined minimum existence. In 
the United States, in contrast, entitlement to many benefits is limited to a relatively short time 
span, while long-term benefits are reserved for specific social groups without sufficient income, 
such as elderly citizens or single mothers with children (Katz 2004, but given the scale of the 
current crisis, even the US government decided to continue the payment of unemployment 
benefits beyond the six-month limit). Differences also emerged in labour regulation: again, 
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despite a series of national peculiarities, labour regulations in western Europe went further than in 
the US, generally as a result of stronger labour protection legislation and the establishment of 
sector-wide collective bargaining systems that went beyond the industrial and public parts of the 
economy (Hyman 2005). In several countries, trade unions and works councils also gained 
certain co-determination rights in private companies. 
Despite important institutional differences and differences in policies, the combination of 
a large public sector, including public services, strong labour protection and comprehensive 
welfare states meant that western European societies reached a level of de-commodification 
during the post-war period that was unmatched by any other capitalist economy at the time and 
by European capitalism today – despite the emergence of a new mode of accumulation based on 
mass consumption, which integrated ever-greater parts of working-class reproduction into the 
cycle of capitalist accumulation (private homes, cars, leisure activities etc.). Hence, if there is an 
essence of the European Social Model it is the comparatively high level of de-commodification 
provided by the institutionally and politically highly disparate European social systems. In 
quantitative terms the effect can primarily be seen in higher levels of equality attained in the core 
of the western European countries and especially in northern Europe, where decommodification 
went furthest. Because they were financed through taxes or income-dependent insurance 
contributions, public services and welfare states had a redistributive and equalising effect. As such 
they were also an expression of solidarity – while contributions were based on economic potential, 
benefits were derived from social needs.  
It is important to note that the European development can only be understood as a result 
of strong and institutionalised trade unions and, for a long time, highly influential social 
democratic and communist parties, as well as by the existence of a non-capitalist alternative in 
Eastern Europe. Hence it was not a different institutional path (these have changed more than 
once on both sides of the Atlantic) or cultural values that led to the emergence of a distinctive 
European Social Model, but social struggles. In contrast to Europe, the United States never had a 
significant countrywide working-class party; communists were prosecuted and tried before courts, 
and after the big successes of the late 1930s and in the years after the Second World War the 
trade union movement was already in decline in the late 1950s. Yet it is also important to see that 
de-commodification had strengthened the solidarity and therefore the position of trade unions 
and progressive forces. Conversely, the wave of re-commodification that has taken place in the 
last thirty years has induced people primarily to care only for their individual interests. Under 
such circumstances it has become more and more difficult to find support for progressive policies. 
As a sad irony of history, the reformist European social democratic parties, which had widely 
propagated a policy of individual responsibility in recent decades, has become the main victim of 
this shift in attitudes (Schmidt 2010). What reason do voters have to vote for social democratic 
parties in a society that increasingly lacks a sense of solidarity? 
 
 
4. The Erosion of the European Social Model 
  
The social models on both sides of the Atlantic have come under growing pressure since 
the 1970s. The thirty years of neoliberal restructuring has profoundly changed the functioning of 
what used to be post-war capitalism. This is not the place to discuss the political background. It 
should be sufficient to mention that the restructuring was enabled by a shift in power relations, 
the most obvious outcomes of which were the takeover or participation of conservative parties in 
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various national governments (including Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom). 
Interestingly, the term European Social Model was introduced into public discourse just at a time 
when the distinctive features of the western European social models were starting to fade 
(Hermann and Hofbauer 2007). The following period saw the liberalisation of international 
trade, the abolition of capital controls as well as the restructuring of welfare states, a weakening of 
labour protection and the privatisation of public enterprises and services. As a result, market 
mechanisms were introduced into areas of social provision that had previously been based on 
planning and coordination rather than on competition, while at the same time new spheres were 
opened up and subsequently subjugated to capital accumulation.  
The restructuring took place at several levels; the European level which simultaneously 
gained importance through the European integration process played a particularly important role 
(Huffschmid 2008, Bieling and Deckwirth 2008). Precisely because the changes were often 
contested at national and local levels, they were introduced at the European level through a series 
of sector directives. These affected the telecommunication and post sectors, railways, electricity 
and gas supply, and with certain qualifications local public transport. Although the directives 
were primarily meant to create competition between various public-service providers and in 
principle did not concern ownership questions, the result of the liberalisation processes was in 
many cases an increase in private ownership, whereas competition remained moderate as public 
monopolies were often replaced by private oligopolies (Hermann and Verhoest 2009).  
In addition to sector directives that effectively forced member states to create public-
service markets, there were also a number of indirect processes that gave rise to similar results. 
Among them is the European public procurement directive, which forces public authorities to 
tender contracts to competing providers. Here the widespread tendency to outsource public 
services in independent subsidiaries to save costs has come full circle. These subsidiaries must now 
compete with private, profit-oriented companies for public-service contracts. Yet it is not always 
outsourcing that has created the problem. In some European members states there is a long 
tradition of voluntary organisations providing public services. These organisations are now forced 
to operate under the same constraints as private, profit-maximising companies. The problem has 
become worse since the adoption of the European service directive, which grants companies from 
other member states the same status in the tendering process as local providers. The first draft of 
the service directive would have subjected health care to the same mechanism. Only fierce 
resistance from social movements, trade unions and left-wing parties at the national level and in 
the European Parliament caused the European Commission to withdraw its plan and remove 
healthcare from the scope of the directive. Ever since, the Commission has been attempting to 
promote the liberalisation of health care through the adoption of a separate directive on cross-
border health care (Hermann 2009a). 
In an indirect way, the Growth and Stability Pact with its strict budget deficit targets has 
also promoted privatisation. Numerous municipalities, but also regional and national 
governments, have sold public services to the private sector because they counted as financial 
liabilities in their balance sheets. In Germany, the result was a systematic sale of public hospitals 
to private investors. In the United Kingdom, hospitals have remained public but for more than 
ten years now almost all new hospitals built in England have been financed through what is called 
a Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Instead of taking up public debt to build and run the hospitals, 
hospital management pays annual fees to their PFI partners in contracts of thirty years or longer. 
There is mounting evidence that the private-sector involvement means that total costs are far 
greater than they would have been if the money had been borrowed by the government, and a 
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number of hospitals have already started to reduce bed numbers in order to pay back higher than 
expected PFI charges (Hellowel and Pollock 2007). The sale of public hospitals or the recourse to 
private money for public investment are only two examples of a far-reaching process in which the 
nature of public services has been altered. Less radical but nevertheless influential forms of ‘cost 
savings’ include the creation of cost and profit-centres, the introduction of internal markets, 
outsourcing and various forms of private-public partnerships.  
Mounting budgetary austerity also left its mark on the traditional welfare system, and 
although social policy is still overwhelmingly the responsibility of the member states. various 
European institutions have persistently argued for the flexibilisation of labour markets and the 
adoption of supply-side oriented labour-market policies. The subsequent restructuring of the 
European welfare states has had two major components: On the one hand the level of welfare 
payments was lowered to the point where it no longer covered minimum living expenses. At the 
same time support became increasingly means-tested and linked to a series of obligations. Overall, 
the reform of the welfare systems amounted to a shift away from welfare as enabler of a social 
existence independent of capital accumulation towards welfare as an instrument to (re)integrate 
people into the labour market as quickly as possible (Jepsen and Amparo 2005: 238). The gradual 
shift from welfare to workfare was complemented by the flexibilisation of labour markets, the 
weakening of labour protection as well as the promotion of atypical and often precarious forms of 
employment. As result, some members of society who have a paid job no longer enjoy an 
adequate level of economic and social security. 
The changes were justified through powerful public campaigns, supported by 
conservatives, liberals and third-way social democrats, discrediting solidarity and instead 
advocating individual responsibility. The erosion of the European Social Model was further 
accelerated through the economic and social transformation in Eastern Europe. While many 
citizens in the new member states were looking for a variation of the western European social 
models of the post-war decades, they received a particularly liberal and hence disembedded form 
of capitalism. However, while the distinctive features of the European Social Model faded, 
references to the ESM became ever more popular. Politicians of various colours used the 
somewhat cynical argument that ‘painful’ reforms were necessary in order to ‘rescue’ the 
European Social Model (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007). A good example for this attitude is the 
discourse on pension reforms. The typical justification for cuts in public pensions and the 
promotion of private retirement funds (which were crucial for the stock market boom leading up 
to the current crisis) was that they were necessary in order to ensure that future generations will 
still receive some public support after retirement. In reality the so-called welfare reforms, the 
flexibilisation of labour markets and the liberalisation and privatisation of public services 
amounted to a profound and far-reaching re-commodification of European societies and brought 
continental Europe a good deal closer to the disembedded capitalism that had emerged after the 
1970s crisis in the US and in the UK.  
The changes introduced to ‘save’ the European Social Model severely weakened the 
redistributive mechanisms built in the post-war social systems. The outcome was therefore first 
and foremost mounting inequality. Following the example of the US, inequality has increased 
substantially in Europe since the 1970s. In an analysis of the development of the Gini coefficient 
(a measurement of inequality), Jens Alber (2006) shows that in eight out of twelve EU member 
states for which data was available inequality has increased since the mid 1980s; in five countries 
inequality has increased even faster than in the United States. The situation would be even worse 
if one were to include the breathtaking growth of inequality in central and eastern Europe 
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(Lóránt 2009). More detailed analyses show that in most countries it is a tiny fraction at the top 
of the income scale that has made the biggest gains. The redistribution of wealth can also be seen 
in the falling wage rates – that is, the decreasing proportion of wages and increasing proportion of 
profits and other non-work-dependent income in relation to the development of national GDP. 
The main reasons for the redistribution from the bottom to the top of the income scale 
were cuts in welfare spending coupled with tax cuts for the rich, stagnating or only marginally 
increasing wages, the growth of unemployment and precarious employment as well as the 
privatisation and marketisation of public enterprises and services. These processes are changing 
what has been perceived as social rights into commodities. Fewer services will be provided, 
financed, regulated and/or controlled by the public. This translates into a considerable cut of the 
social wage and reinforces economic and social insecurities in times when unemployment, harsh 
working and living conditions and poverty are on the increase in one of the richest regions in the 
world.  
In the case of the network industries, providers were no longer required to supply the 
services to all users on the same conditions. Large customers in the electricity industry and in 
postal services can meanwhile negotiate individual price discounts, while in several cases tariffs for 
households have increased since liberalisation and privatisation. In postal services, access to 
services has become more costly for service-users in certain mostly rural areas since a large number 
of post offices have been closed. Similar effects were caused by the closures of local railways, 
which has left a number of areas with no or unsatisfactory access to public transport. Here, too, it 
is low-income earners who cannot afford a car for each working family member that are most 
affected. In the case of private pensions, existing inequalities have been amplified while low-
income earners pay higher fees for private health insurance because they are statistically less 
healthy. Inequality has not only accelerated in the monetary sphere. In the most extreme cases the 
reforms have led to the provision of different services for different groups of service users. The 
emergence of a two-tier healthcare system in central and eastern Europe, where only those 
without sufficient personal funds rely on the heavily underfunded and rapidly deteriorating 
public system, is a drastic example of such a development. Experience suggests that services 
provided for the poor are mostly poor services (Mahnkopf 2009: 228). 
Liberalisation and privatisation have not only increased inequality among public-service 
users. At the same time inequality between public-service workers has also grown. Differences 
within and between workforces have increased  substantially as a result of the fragmentation and 
erosion of collective bargaining, the shift towards performance-based wage components and the 
attitude of unions in protecting the gains of the long-established workers at the cost of new 
employees. There is a danger that gradually public goods such as education, healthcare or social 
security in times of old-age, sickness or unemployment shift from a resource the state owes to its 
citizens to a consumer product for which the individual must take responsibility. This 
development being directly linked to the essence of privatisation can be judged as a regress of a 
universalistic and law-based system to contractual, market-based relationships. Market-based 
relationships do not exclude universalistic constructions in principle, but they create obstacles for 








5. The Current Crisis and the Future of the European Social Model 
 
Despite the far-reaching restructuring of post-war capitalism there are still remnants of the 
European Social Model. The welfare regimes were cut back, but never fully abolished. Workers 
still have rights and despite heavy losses in membership the European trade union movement is 
still stronger than its American counterpart; and although marketisation processes have 
penetrated large parts of public services, health, education and social services are still mainly 
provided by public or voluntary organisations. Above all, the elites in Europe, despite persistently 
appealing to individual responsibility, have failed to wipe out the confidence of Europeans in the 
state as a collective problem-solving instrument. This has the important effect that poverty or 
social need in Europe is not necessarily seen as an expression of individual failure – a widespread 
attitude in the United States. The positive connotation the term European Social Model still 
enjoys among Europeans despite consistent attempts by the elites to change its meaning is 
primarily due to the fact that Europeans associate with it something different from the US social 
model and the related individualisation and commodification of the modes of living (Hermann 
und Hofbauer 2007).  
Politicians from various political backgrounds have demanded more regulation, especially 
of financial markets, to solve the current crisis. New regulation is supposed the make markets 
work better and more efficiently. This should not be confused with re-embedding of the 
economy in the wider society as proposed by Polanyi. Instead of making markets more ‘efficient’, 
Polanyi’s anti-liberal project demands not for better regulation but for a limitation of market 
forces in order to restrict the dependence of social reproduction on capital accumulation. The 
struggle for a new European Social Model could be at the heart of a progressive project aimed at 
greater de-commodification. In our view, a revitalisation of the ESM (Huffschmid and Mazier 
2009) has to focus on three main issues: firstly on welfare states and employment and working 
conditions; secondly on the public sector and in particular on public services; and thirdly on a 
far-reaching democratisation of European societies.  
 
5.1. THE RENEWAL OF THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES 
Michael Krätke (2005: 92) writes that the European Social Model still has the future 
ahead of it and suggests that the European left could use the ESM as a trademark for a new 
political project. ‘In most European countries the concept of the welfare state, which is not just 
obliged to the owners of capital but to all citizens, still enjoys the widest support. The neoliberal 
idea of the minimal state, which goes back to pure relief of poverty, is a long way from having 
won, even if the market ideologies that are part of it dominate the minds of the so-called elite’ 
(ibid). As a first step, the renewal of the European welfare states would have to reverse many of 
the reforms that were introduced in the past three decades under neoliberal hegemony. Yet this 
would not be sufficient. At the same time, the structural weaknesses and insufficiencies of the 
post-war systems must also be tackled. Among these is the reproduction of inequality inherent in 
the conservative welfare systems caused by the link between benefits and contributions; other 
insufficiencies are the means-tested elements in universal welfare states of the British type as well 
as the recourse to family structures implicit in the southern European welfare systems. In a 
number of countries it would already be a success if the national systems were to become more 
like the Scandinavian welfare states – although neoliberal restructuring has left its mark on these 
systems too. In addition to the decoupling of benefits and contributions and the still 
comparatively high level of support, Scandinavian welfare states differ from others through the 
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fact that monetary benefits are complemented by support in kind. The state operates 
kindergartens, schools and homes for elderly citizens. This has three major advantages: women, 
who do the vast majority of care work, can get a regular paid job; workers are given reasonable 
wages and working conditions, and quality and access are the same for all citizens regardless of 
their incomes. In short, the renewed European welfare states must not only redistribute wealth, 
they must also create an extensive social infrastructure. 
The social infrastructure must be combined with provision of an unconditional basic 
income for all citizens who do not have sufficient other income sources. A basic income is not 
only essential for a welfare system that grants an existence independent of markets and capital 
accumulation, it also gives a long overdue acknowledgement of the vast amount of work which is 
indispensable but is not paid in capitalist societies. However, the renewed European welfare 
systems should not only grant support for those outside the labour markets. Progress with respect 
to the status quo must also include the adoption of a different labour-market policy. Workers 
should still be supported in their search for new jobs, including access to training or further 
education, but assistance should help people to develop personal capacities rather than ‘activating’ 
clients by pushing them into precarious jobs. Furthermore, the emphasis should be on the 
creation of job opportunities through the expansion of the welfare state and public services and 
the promotion of a not-for-profit-oriented social economy sector. In part, a Keynesian inspired 
demand-side policy can also be helpful.  
Precarious employment relations and a strong welfare state are mutually exclusive. Every 
employment contract must grant sufficient income and social security for workers and their 
dependants. Above all, employment must enable workers to make long-term plans for their lives. 
In addition to strong employment-protection legislation, this requires also strong and 
comprehensive collective-bargaining systems. Certainly helpful in this regard would be the 
establishment of common European minimum wages and maximum working hours. At the heart 
of a renewed European Social Model must be a substantial reduction of working hours. Shorter 
working hours not only help to tackle unemployment and distribute income more equally (in 
most countries women work part-time and men full-time), they are a first step to breaking out of 
the vicious circle of production and consumption for the sake of accumulation. Given the 
accelerating ecological crisis, a new European Social Model must develop ecologically sustainable 
production and consumption patterns. Shorter working hours and the expansion of social services 
at the cost of industrial (mass) production will be crucial elements in a sustainable society. 
 
5.2. THE RECONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As mentioned above, the creation of a European social infrastructure will include the 
provision of public goods and services. For several reasons the public sector and in particular 
public services are of vital importance in a renewed European Social Model. Welfare-state 
redistribution can mitigate social inequality, but it does not question it in a fundamental way. In 
contrast, the use of public services can, indeed, be the same for all citizens regardless of individual 
incomes. The redistributive effects of equally and perhaps freely accessible public services can in 
fact be more important than welfare payments in improving social integration and cohesion. The 
public sector can furthermore provide high quality jobs not only for highly qualified workers and 
by doing so reduce unemployment and build up pressure on private employers to improve 
employment and working conditions. A strong public sector would also introduce elements of 
planning and coordination and therefore stability to an otherwise market-mediated economy. 
Inasmuch as public goods and services are provided outside markets, they can even help to 
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transcend the market economy. The public sector, furthermore, can be deployed to develop 
innovative products, production technologies and services, enabling the emergence of a new 
mode of production and consumption that is urgently needed to tackle the looming ecological 
crisis. A new and sustainable mode of reproduction must give collective consumption priority 
over individual consumption. The crisis of the automobile industry drastically shows the 
problems of an individualised and market-mediated consumption model. At the same time, the 
crisis of the automobile industry also shows that the market may not be the best way to decide 
what is produced for whom and under what conditions. States have a responsibility to ensure that 
the goods and services produced are really needed.  
For these reasons the ongoing liberalisation and privatisation of public services in Europe 
must be stopped and reversed. Even conservative evaluations show that they have not brought the 
promised results. Particular attention must be paid to preventing the use of public-private 
partnerships and other forms of marketisation, as pressure to involve private capital in the delivery 
of public services will probably increase as a result of the budgetary crisis following the bank 
bailouts. There is no proof that private companies can provide the same quantity and quality of 
services for less money. In contrast, there is mounting evidence that private-sector involvement 
greatly increases costs and there is plenty of proof that privatisation and marketisation increases 
inequality. Yet it is not enough to simply rebuild the public sector. The functioning of the sector 
needs to be altered. The past has shown that it is not sufficient for providers to be publicly 
owned. In several countries, public banks in search of exceptional returns were as heavily involved 
in global financial markets as private banks – and were therefore just as badly hit by the crisis. 
The key to avoiding the same failure again is the advancement of democratic control and user 
involvement.  
Public services must differ from private services by focusing on use value rather than on 
exchange value. This is perhaps what third-way public service reformers mean when they demand 
for ‘value for money’. What these reformers do not understand, however, is that promoting use 
value means putting the needs of the people before the needs of the market. To ensure that the 
needs of the users are met, the market model must be replaced by a new public-service model that 
grants service-users more influence than the possibility of choosing between two or more equally 
unsatisfactory alternatives. Instead, the new public-service model must be based on participation 
in planning and provision of services. This can be organised in various ways, including the 
creation of public-service advisory boards with representatives from management, the workforce, 
service users and experts, or the establishment of new forms of service delivery with users 
assuming the role of co-producers. Participation and user involvement presents a better 
alternative to bureaucratic control and marketisation. Yet the same principle should also be 
applied to the internal organisation of public-service providers. This calls for a new relationship 
between workers and management and greater worker involvement in decision-making processes 
– perhaps along with the above-mentioned participation by service users. Of course such a model 
would have wider repercussions and serve a far-reaching democratisation of the European 
societies. 
 
5.3 DEMOCRATISING THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL 
‘Socialism, is, essentially the tendency inherent in an industrial civilisation to transcend 
the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society’ (Polanyi, 2001: 
242). In this quote Polanyi highlights the fundamental tension between a ‘free’ market economy 
and a society in which decisions are made democratically. In contrast to the widely held view, the 
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disembedding of markets and the roll-back of the welfare state did not mean that (nation) states 
per se have become weaker. On the contrary, in several aspects states have actually become 
stronger and they have had no problems in breaking fierce resistance to the implementation of 
neoliberal policies. In fact many European states have adopted increasingly authoritarian 
characteristics as part of the social and political restructuring processes of the last thirty years. On 
the one hand this can be seen in a strengthening of the position of the executive branch 
(ministries) vis-à-vis the legislative branch (parliament); on the other in a shift of power relations 
within the executive branch with the ministries for security and finance becoming the power 
centres in the governments. A typical example is the banking-sector bailout packages: although 
the sums that were negotiated amounted to several billion euros of public money, the bailout 
packages were agreed by a small number of people, including representatives from the finance 
ministries, behind locked doors. Members of parliament at the best could call for some minor 
adjustments to otherwise fixed deals. Security is another issue where states have become 
increasingly authoritarian, because growing social inequality demands increasing resources to 
control the population at the bottom end of the income scale (and because inequality has also 
grown on a global scale the control of those from the global south who want to immigrate to 
Europe). 
At the European level the lack of democratic accountability is aggravated by specific 
characteristics of the European integration process: the role of the European Parliament is largely 
limited to confirming proposals from the European Commission and Council, both organisations 
with disputable democratic legitimacy, while the European Court of Justice exploits the absence 
of a satisfactory legal foundation to persistently remove the still existing national employment and 
social rights (Altvater and Mahnkopf 2007).3 It should be no surprise that this attitude is leading 
to growing frustration and a refusal to vote, as can be seen by the historically low turnout rate at 
the European elections in spring 2009. The growing lack of legitimacy is the result of the primacy 
of economic over social integration. A forward-looking European Social Model must therefore 
break with the established mode of integration and balance economic with social integration, or, 
in Polanyi’s words, to embed the European economy in a European society. Perhaps this calls for 
a legal basis for European integration that goes beyond the common-market objectives, including 
legal provisions that allow for the creation of a European-wide public sector and of a non-profit-
oriented social economy (Huffschmid 2008). It is no accident that the idea of a European Social 
Model was born out of the recognition that nobody will fall in love with a market.  
Yet while the task at the European level is to create democratic relations that already exist 
at the level of the nation states, the objective at the national level is to stop the authoritarian 
tendencies and to strengthen the democratic and social rights of citizens in the sense of a social 
democracy that lives up to its name. Access to public services should be understood as a social 
right. Access to public education that helps citizens to develop personal capacities rather than 
increasing their chances to succeed as market participants plays a particular role, as it allows 
citizens to develop a democratic consciousness and the social and political commitment in order 
to see and take up the collective challenges ahead instead of simply pursuing individual interests 
at others’ expense (Mahnkopf 2008). In this light, taxes should not be seen as a threat to 
individual wealth but as a possibility to advance social cohesion and integration and to shape the 
future of European societies. On a longer term, the task, perhaps, is to develop participation 
mechanisms that go beyond the limits of representative democracy. The provision of public 
services could be used as a test case for the development of new participatory models, which could 





The four-fold crisis of capitalism, consisting of financial, economic, energy and climate 
crises, challenges the paradigm of an economy that is disembedded from all social and natural 
bonds. Rethinking policies is essential. However, even if finance-led capitalism and the neoliberal 
pensée unique (Bourdieu 1997) disgraced themselves historically, both as an economic and social 
model and as a role model for politics and public opinion, the break with neoliberalism so far has 
only taken place on a semantic level. Much worse, with the bank bailouts effecting a larger 
expropriation than ever before, the neoliberal program actually continued the old ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003). In the long term the massive transfer of wealth from labour to 
capital that this type of capital accumulation has brought may help to undermine the functioning 
of capitalism. But recently, despite its failures and the damages it caused, the neoliberal doctrine 
still meets no opposition in the EU. 
A radical social-economic change of the system is pending on the agenda. But for such a 
change to come about it needs a political left both willing and able to develop and present 
political options and systems of reference which could result in a reliable alternative to neo-liberal 
capitalism. In other words, what is needed is a new ‘collectivist counter-movement’.4 So far, in 
Europe there is no attractive left project for future development, which could combine the 
strength and the constituencies of the political parties being placed left of centre as well as trade 
unions, social movements and critical intellectuals willing to commit  their energies  to a political 
and strategic framework which could spread out to the society at large. It would be necessary to 
demonstrate that despite all their internal differences a new ‘mosaic-left’ (Urban 2009) could be 
perceived and respected as a heterogeneous collective actor. 
At the hey day of ‘industrial modernity’ after World War II the left mainly concentrated 
itself on the redistribution issue and had a tendency to ignore the ecological impact of a growth-
based model of social welfare as well as other forms of work than standard employment within 
the formal economy – which resulted in a fairly  low regard for reproduction work performed 
mainly by women. While since the 1980s, the so-called ‘post-modern left’ shifted the emphasis 
towards self-determination as its most important political issue and was somehow ignorant 
towards the immense relevance of the ‘social question’. Today, the approaches of both traditions 
have to be reconciled, in order to develop concepts for a solidaristic society which builds on 
principles such as: social justice and social cohesion, economic cooperation and protection of 
economic, social and environmental potential on the local and regional levels instead of 
competition on a world-wide scale, redistribution instead of economic growth as the basis of 
public wealth – and on a renewal of participatory democracy (see Mahnkopf 2010). 
However, this will not be an easy task, neither in Europe nor in one of the other highly 
developed industrialised countries of the West. Numerous tensions and controversial concepts 
will have to be faced. Obviously, the reconstruction and expansion of the public sector would be 
of vital importance for a new and sustainable mode of reproduction which must give collective 
consumption priority over individual consumption. Yet, as has been argued in this article, it will 
not be enough to simply rebuild the public sector. Reclaiming solidarity to face a fair future for 
all requires taking as many goods and services as possible out of the market that is ‘de-
commodifying’ them in order to free ourselves from its coercive power. But also the debate about 
a ‘new green deal’, that is a somehow ‘greener capitalism’ vs. options for socially sustainable 
economic ‘de-growth’ (see Schneider, Kallis and Martinez-Alier 2010) will be a hot topic for 
discussion. Much will depend on the further functioning of ‘crisis corporatism’, so far the only 
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option many European trade unions are familiar with and trust. However, it is highly 
questionable whether his option, despite its ecological short sightedness, can be sustained if fights 






1Although Polanyi (2001: 298-9) did not elaborate specifically on public goods and services, his 
comments on Red Vienna after the First World War and the large public housing projects (which 
he experienced first hand as Vienna resident) shows that he was well aware of the role of public 
goods and services in socially embedding the economy. At some point he even suggested that the 
experiment of Vienna was not only an attempt to embed but to transcend the market economy. 
 
2Alongside the introduction of a minimum wage and the 40-hour week, part of the New Deal 
was the drawing up of more than 500 industry codes, which served to limit the ‘excessive’ 
competition which, in the view of the Roosevelt administration, was partly responsible for the 
crisis. 
 
3In Germany, the Rüffert case in particular caused a stir. On 3 April 2008 the ECJ ruled against 
the Federal State [Land] of Lower Saxony for insisting that a Polish company should adhere to 
the minimum wage laid down in collective agreement for the construction industry.  
 
4For a critical view on the perspectives of counter-movements emerging in response to the 
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